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Neonatal imitation has rich implications for neuroscience, developmental psychology,
and social cognition, but there is little consensus about this phenomenon. The primary
empirical question, whether or not neonatal imitation exists, is not settled. Is it possible to
give a balanced evaluation of the theories and methodologies at stake so as to facilitate
real progress with respect to the primary empirical question? In this paper, we address
this question. We present the operational definition of differential imitation and discuss
why it is important to keep it in mind. The operational definition indicates that neonatal
imitation may not look like prototypical imitation and sets non-obvious requirements on
what can count as evidence for imitation. We also examine the principal explanations
for the extant findings and argue that two theories, the arousal hypothesis and the
Association by Similarity Theory, which interprets neonatal imitation as differential
induction of spontaneous behavior through similarity, offer better explanations than the
others. With respect to methodology, we investigate what experimental design can best
provide evidence for imitation, focusing on how differential induction may be maximized
and detected. Finally, we discuss the significance of neonatal imitation for the field of
social cognition. Specifically, we propose links with theories of social interaction and
direct social perception. Overall, our goals are to help clarify the complex theoretical
issues at stake and suggest fruitful guidelines for empirical research.
Keywords: neonate imitation, arousal, active intermodal matching (AIM), association by similarity (AST),
experimental methodology, social cognition
INTRODUCTION
There is a presumed phenomenon, well circumscribed but particularly intriguing, over which the
science of embodied intersubjectivity has to take a position. This phenomenon concerns the first
2 months of post-natal life and is labeled “neonatal imitation” (NI), giving the term “neonatal”
an unusually wide sense (Meltzoff and Moore, 1997; Nagy et al., 2013; Simpson et al., 2014;
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Oostenbroek et al., 2016).1 The questions of whether and in
what sense infants in that early stage imitate facial gestures have
considerable implications. For example, if NI actually occurs,
resistance toward the idea that the newborn’s brain may regulate
responses that match different visual models (Keven and Akins,
2016) will have to be revised. If NI is real, the hypothesis
that imitation develops through associations via contiguity and
contingency (Ray and Heyes, 2011) is seriously undermined if
not altogether falsified. And if imitation is real but the findings
do not justify postulating a foundational socio-cognitive role for
the “recognition” of self-other similarities, then Meltzoff and
Moore’s (1997) influential theory should be called into question
on this point. Thus, although it is unlikely that a widespread
agreement will be reached soon, it is worth striving toward a
solution to the questions surrounding NI as they have significant
repercussions for neuroscience, developmental psychology, and
social cognition.
In this paper, our goal is to contribute to both theory and
empirical methodology. In Section “The Operational Definition
and the Importance of Keeping it in Mind,” we present
the operational definition of NI as differential imitation and
discuss why it is important to keep it in mind. In Section
“Explanations for the NI Findings ,” we examine the principal
explanations for the NI findings and argue that two theories,
the arousal hypothesis and the recent Association by Similarity
Theory (AST), have better prospects than the others. In
Section “Proposals for Experimental Design,” we investigate what
experimental design can best provide evidence for differential
imitation, focusing on how AST may be verified. In Section
“Significance for the Field of Social Cognition,” we discuss the
implications of NI for the field of social cognition. Overall, our
goals are to help clarify the complex theoretical issues at stake
and suggest fruitful guidelines for empirical research.
The Operational Definition and the
Importance of Keeping it in Mind
In order to operationalize imitation, Meltzoff and Moore (1977)
postulated the following: infants imitate a particular behavior
if there is a statistically significant increase of that behavior in
the presence of the modeling of that behavior as compared to
the modeling of alternative behavior(s). For instance, they tested
whether “infants produce more tongue protrusions (TPs) after an
adult demonstrates TP than after the same adult demonstrates
mouth opening (MO), and vice versa” (Meltzoff and Moore,
1977, p. 76). Thus, NI was defined from the start as “differential
imitation” (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977, p. 76) and that definition
has been employed in the great majority of empirical studies
concerning NI (Meltzoff, 2005; Coulon et al., 2013; Oostenbroek
et al., 2016).
Hereafter we call the increase that a gesture exhibits when
the corresponding model is presented compared to when
other models are presented Comparative Increase for the
1In this paper, we adopt this terminology. Primarily, we use the expression
“neonatal imitation” (NI) as shorthand for “differential imitation in the first
2 months of post-natal life.” At times, however, we use the expression more broadly
to refer to the relevant empirical literature, whether or not this literature actually
provides evidence for differential imitation.
Corresponding Model (CICM). In this first section, we focus on
TP and MO as examples, because they are the actions for which
CICM is most frequently reported. In particular, the CICM for
TP is reliably documented (Heimann et al., 1989; Meltzoff and
Moore, 1992; Ullstadius, 1998; Coulon et al., 2013; Nagy et al.,
2013).
Why is imitation operationalized as differential imitation?
The reason—already specified by Meltzoff and Moore (1977)—
is that imitation has to be distinguished from a global arousal
response. Observing that TP increases in response to the TP
model as compared to when the infant is presented with a
still face does not in itself indicate imitation. In such cases it
would be more parsimonious to think that the baby is aroused
by the presentation of TP and increases its TP production as
a consequence of its state of arousal. Indeed, we could point
to the now well-known data reported by Jones (1996, 2006),
that perceiving flashing lights, dangling toys, and classical music
increases TP in infants. In the absence of more compelling
evidence for imitation, one could think that what causes the TP
response in the case of TP presentation is merely the arousal
state, which is provoked just as well by other arbitrary stimuli.
The perception of characteristic features of TP would not play a
determinant role in generating the matching response and so the
matching response could not count as imitation. The operational
definition of imitation must neutralize the arousal explanation in
advance; otherwise there is no guarantee that minimal conditions
for imitation are met.
Meltzoff and Moore’s (1977, 1997; Meltzoff, 2002, 2005)
insistence on the claim that a plurality of gestures exhibits CICM
indicates that the operational definition of imitation should be
understood as entailing reference to such plurality of gestures.
There is differential imitation only if more than one gesture
exhibits a statistically significant increase when the same gesture
is presented compared to when other gestures are presented, i.e.,
only if more than one gesture exhibits CICM. In this regard, it
is noteworthy that advocates of the arousal explanation ground
their hypothesis on the claim that only one gesture presents
CICM. Hence these theorists seem to accept that if more than
one gesture were to exhibit CICM the arousal hypothesis would
be falsified or seriously undermined (Anisfeld, 2005; Jones, 2009;
Ray and Heyes, 2011).
The arousal hypothesis is untenable in the presence of
differential imitation. This hypothesis can explain CICM for one
gesture if that gesture’s modeling is more arousing than other
models. In particular, the TP model may elicit more TPs than
other models in a set because it is the most arousing stimulus
in that set. Yet, if another model (e.g., MO) also elicits the
corresponding gesture more than the other models (including
TP), the arousal explanation encounters a problem. Indeed,
Meltzoff and Moore (1977; Meltzoff, 2002, 2005) understood
arousal as a global state that increases overall action production,
not just a particular action. Thus, if TP has been assumed to be
the most arousing model to explain the CICM of TP, TP should
solicit more MO than the MO model because it provokes a greater
state of arousal and, among other responses, more MO. The
same holds for the other gestures in the set under consideration.
Therefore, according to the arousal hypothesis, TP would cause
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a comparative increase in other gestures as well, excluding the
possibility that comparative increase for these other gestures is
caused by their corresponding models. So understood, the arousal
hypothesis predicts the absence of differential imitation for a
plurality of gestures.
There is, however, a more promising way to elaborate the
arousal hypothesis: Jones (2009) proposed that arousal might
actually elicit just one particular behavior. Specifically, the
TP model could cause an increase in TP, but not in MO.
Furthermore, increase in TP could affect the frequency of
spontaneous MO, since an infant engaged in TP production
would have fewer occasions to produce MO (Ray and Heyes,
2011). This consideration could explain CICM for MO with
respect to the TP model: MO production would be less impeded
by TP in presence of the MO model. However, granted all this,
the arousal hypothesis remains at a loss to explain the CICM for
MO with respect to still face or models other than TP. If arousal
does not increase MO, then the MO model should not elicit more
MO than a still face. And how could arousal explain that the
MO model solicits more MO than the lip protrusion (LP) or
head rotation (HR) models? An ad hoc readjustment positing that
MO is more arousing than these other models would be highly
unsatisfactory (see Proposals for Experimental Design).
In short, if differential imitation is documented for more than
one gesture, and data analysis entails more than the comparison
between the effects of two models, the arousal hypothesis fails.
Generally, the more gestures exhibit CICM the more impractical
the arousal explanation becomes. Nobody would defend the idea
of different kinds of arousal for differential imitation: an arousal
caused by and causing TP, an arousal caused by and causing MO,
and so forth.
In concluding this first section, we state two reasons why it is
important that contributors to the debate keep the operational
definition of imitation firmly in mind. First, the operational
definition establishes the primary empirical question that should
be investigated. Does differential imitation involving a plurality
of gestures exist? If the answer is no, then arousal is the most
sensible explanation and the debate is settled. If the answer is
yes, then it is legitimate to assume that it is the perception of the
specific action features of the model (not just its arousal value)
that plays a role in generating CICMs.
Accordingly, the operational definition allows one to decide
what findings may count as evidence for imitation. For example,
Simpson et al. (2016) do not provide evidence for NI, although
the authors use this label for their findings. Simpson et al.
(2016) found that about half of the newborn monkeys under
investigation produced a greater increase of lipsmacking from
baseline (passive face) to the lipsmacking model than from
baseline to a control model (a rotating colored disk). Lipsmacking
is known to occur more often in presence of different types of
arousing stimuli, just like TP in human infants (Subiaul, 2010).
The very fact that in Simpson et al. (2016) lipsmacking increased
in presence of the rotating colored disk suggests that this stimulus
provoked some arousal. Thus, Simpson et al.’s (2016) results with
newborn monkeys may be easily explained by assuming that
half of the infants found the lipsmacking human model more
arousing than the rotating disk. Ultimately, the term “imitation”
is not warranted in this study because differential imitation is not
attested for more than one gesture.
Second, the operational definition orients theories of NI
because it specifies the actual phenomenon that needs to be
explained. Given that imitation is defined as a differential increase
in the frequencies of gestures that are spontaneously produced, it
seems clear that theories of NI must relate imitative responses
to spontaneous activity and must seek a satisfactory account
for this relation. Indeed, all studies of NI investigate gestures
spontaneously produced by infants. Even Meltzoff and Moore
(1994), who investigated the “unusual” tongue-protrusion-to-
the-side behavior, found that, in a 90-s test period, such behavior
was spontaneously produced by 6 infants out of 30 who had never
seen the tongue-protrusion-to-the-side model.
Furthermore, there is another feature in the operational
definition of remarkable theoretical import. Consider the
evidence for MO imitation reported in two key studies in the NI
literature: Meltzoff and Moore (1977, 1994). The former study
found a significant CICM for MO with respect to baseline and
TP (Experiment 2). In the latter study, there was also CICM
for MO with respect to baseline and TP, but it did not reach
statistical significance. Evidence for MO imitation was provided
by a significant increase in the duration of MO in response to
the MO model compared to the control conditions—we may
describe this evidence as a CICM for MO duration. However,
the remarkable feature of MO imitation in both studies is that
infants produced more TP than MO in response to the MO
model. In Meltzoff and Moore (1994), the sum of the mean
frequencies of TP in response to MO (31.90) was well over twice
the corresponding value for MO (13.70). Hence, an imaginary
observer attending only the trials in which MO was presented
would have seen infants performing more than two TP for every
MO they produced. This is not what we would expect based on
the prototypical idea of imitation, according to which it is natural
to think that infants imitate MO if they produce more MO than
TP in response to the MO model. Indeed, it is not unlikely that,
if unaware of the hypothesis under investigation and without
the possibility of comparing her observations with the control
conditions, the imaginary observer would have not described the
interactions she attended as MO imitation. Yet these findings
count as MO imitation because they meet the requirements of the
operational definition—Meltzoff and Moore (1997, 1994) found
CICM for TP and MO. Therefore, the operational definition
does not guarantee that imitative responses appear as such to
an observer. Differential imitation may not look like ordinary
imitation!
It follows that a theory of NI may be misguided if tends to
describe NI as being similar to ordinary imitation. Moreover,
hypotheses that base the social function of imitation on its
recognizable appearance should be treated with great caution.
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to reject the term “imitation”
altogether just because responses may not be visible as ordinary
imitation. As already mentioned, the operational definition
of imitation guarantees a minimal requirement for imitation:
infants must perceive characteristic features of the modeled
action and then they must tend to produce the same action on the
basis of their perception of its characteristic features, not because
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of other irrelevant properties of the perceived model (e.g., its
arousing properties).2 In absence of a better word, all phenomena
presenting this minimal kind of perception-action connection
can be labeled as “imitation,” granted that not all of them will
exhibit the features of prototypical imitation.
Explanations for the NI Findings
There are two main types of explanations for the NI findings,
depending on what goal they set out to achieve, i.e., on what they
take the explanandum to be. There are theories for which the only
thing that has to be explained is the CICM for TP (and, perhaps,
the accidental appearance of CICM in other rare cases). Other
theories aim at explaining differential imitation. So, on one side,
there are theories that assume that findings do not and will not
prove the existence of differential imitation. On the other side,
there are theories that rely on the opposite assumption. In this
section, we review principal theories on both sides and examine
which ones have the most explanatory power.
Before we start our critical survey, we need to make it clear
that our discussion is guided by our overall appraisal of the extant
findings. We think that detractors of differential imitation have
done a good job in showing that existing evidence for differential
imitation is not compelling (Anisfeld, 2005; Jones, 2009; Ray and
Heyes, 2011; Heyes, 2016). However, we do not think this justifies
denying its existence. It is possible that current findings point to
a nucleus of differential imitation the existence of which will be
firmly demonstrated by future research. In our view, the extant
empirical literature, despite its extensiveness, is still ambiguous.
Let us then begin with theories based on the empirical
claim that only TP exhibits CICM (i.e., differential imitation
does not exist). Anisfeld (1991) presents two theories of this
kind: the Innate Releasing Mechanism (IRM) and the “attention,
response release” hypotheses. IRM (Jacobson, 1979; Abravanel
and Sigafoos, 1984; Bjorklund, 1987) posits that TP is a fixed
action pattern released under a relatively specific set of stimulus
conditions (e.g., stimuli, including the TP model, resembling
an approaching nipple). An IRM is more flexible than a
standard reflex (e.g., Moro reflex); hence the notion seemed
to account for the documented variability of the TP behavior.
The second theory, the “attention, response release” hypothesis
simply supposes that infants inhibit spontaneous TP when their
attention is captured by the TP model and then discharge a
higher rate of TP when the model disappears, as a function of
the energy that has built up internally during inhibition. This
latter proposal can be considered an arousal explanation. Indeed,
one can assume that arousal is precisely what builds up during
model presentation and is expressed as higher rates of TP in the
model-free response period.
Arousal
Since Jones (1996, 2006) demonstrated TP increases in response
to a wider set of stimuli than what the IRM hypothesis predicted,
recent skeptics of differential imitation converged on the arousal
2Meltzoff and Moore (1994, p. 83): “In order to imitate, the child must see the
adult’s actions, use this visual perception as a basis for an action plan, and execute
the motor output” (see also Prinz et al., 2009, p. 48).
explanation for the CICM of TP (Anisfeld, 2005; Jones, 2009; Ray
and Heyes, 2011). We recapitulate five main reasons for why this
is a viable explanation:
(i) Differential imitation is disputable because findings are
highly variable and often negative (e.g., Oostenbroek et al.,
2016).
(ii) A variety of arousing stimuli in different modalities elicit
TP (Jones, 2009).
(iii) Jones (1996) found that 4-week-olds looked longer at a TP
display than a MO display, confirming the assumption that
TP is more arousing to infants than other modeled actions.
This assumption allows the arousal hypothesis to account
for reliable CICM for TP.
(iv) Tongue protrusion behaves like other spontaneous
stereotypies characterizing development which increase as
a result of non-specific stimuli connected to arousal (Keven
and Akins, 2016).
(v) Jones (1996, 2006) found that arousing stimuli other
than modeled actions (lights, toys, music) cause a specific
increase of TP, but not a diffuse increase of other actions as
well. Thus, the arousal hypothesis can explain the fact that
the TP model does not produce a comparative increase in
the production of other gestures (e.g., MO).
Some (e.g., Simpson et al., 2014) would not grant the first
point, that the existence of differential imitation is disputable.
In any case, the other four points are so compelling that even
defenders of differential imitation should accommodate arousal
as a factor contributing to the CICM for TP. Arousing stimuli
of disparate kinds elicit TP and the TP model is an arousing
stimulus. At a minimum, imitation defenders should accept that
in addition to being imitative, TP is also an arousal response.
We now move to accounts that aim at explaining differential
imitation.
Genetically Programmed Direct Matching (GPDM)
Genetically programmed direct matching is the name we assign
to the psychological model of differential imitation that is
most naturally associated with the classical genetic account of
mirror neurons (Cook et al., 2014; Tramacere et al., 2015).
Jones (2009) introduces this type of model as requiring infants
to have significantly fewer cognitive abilities than what AIM
assumes. In fact, GPDM heavily relies on an evolutionary
story: populations in which newborn brains were able to
automatically connect the perception of specific actions with
their corresponding action plans were selected. This is why we
qualify this matching of action perceptions with action plans as
“genetically programmed.”
That action plan activation is automatic means that the infant
does not need to know why it has an impulse to act in a certain
way rather than another. The infant perceives a specific action
and then has a tendency to act in a specific way. According
to GPDM, this is a complete description of the psychological
states underlying imitation. Regulating which action tendency
follows which perception is the work of neural mechanisms
selected through evolution, but no psychological operation of the
infant is directed at these mechanisms. In other words, it is not
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FIGURE 1 | Conceptual schematic of the GPDM model. Visual representations (Vn) are connected with the corresponding action representations (An) through
automatic connections encoded by the genes. These genetic links are not domain-general processes of association; rather, they were specifically selected for social
or socio-cognitive functions. This schematic is comparable in format with those of AIM and AST in Figure 2. In both Figures 1, 2, an “action representation” refers
to a spontaneous habitual action. Accordingly, an action representation includes the representation of the characteristic features of the action as experienced
proprioceptively and, therefore, the representation of those characteristic features as integrated in the “action plan” for the action.
necessary for infants to recognize equivalences between modeled
and executed actions. NI may still serve a social function in that
it affects caregivers and positive infant-caregiver interaction is
promoted (Heimann, 2002).
We note that GPDM as a model of differential imitation
has not been developed to account for the details of the
empirical literature. Moreover, it has not been defended in
opposition to the most well known model of differential
imitation (AIM). Here, we consider it only in so far as
alternative explanations cannot be understood if it is not clear
how they differ from GPDM. Hence, in this subsection, we
anticipate its differences from other theories, i.e., AIM and
AST.
We qualify perception-action matching in GPDM as “direct”
precisely because it does not require infants to recognize self-
other similarities. This is a critical difference from Meltzoff
and Moore’s (1997) AIM model. Meltzoff and Decety (2003,
p. 494) distinguish the mirror neuron based model from AIM
because the latter posits “an active comparison and lack of
confusion between self and other.” Indeed, Meltzoff and Decety
propose that mirror neurons may not be sufficient to implement
the psychological operations necessary for imitation. Something
more (the inferior parietal lobe) is likely to be required to
implement the recognition of “both the similarity and the
distinction between actions of the self and other” (Meltzoff and
Decety, 2003, p. 494). The point is repeated in Meltzoff (2009,
p. 38) where it is suggested that mirror neurons are not well
suited to account for the psychological phenomena AIM seeks
to explain, notably “response correction” and “the imitation of
novel acts.”
In order to anticipate its difference from AST, we need
to emphasize that GPDM does not assign any functional role
to the domain-general process of association by similarity.
Perception-action connections are essentially different from the
ordinary process by which a current visual stimulus is interpreted
in light of a similar perceptual experience (generalization).
Rather, in GPDM, perceptual representations are connected with
corresponding action representations through genetic links that
were specifically selected for social or socio-cognitive functions
(Figure 1).3
3In this paper we follow the extant literature in using the term ‘representation.’ We
take this term to be equivalent to a pattern of neural activation that co-varies with
a relevant stimulus or experience.
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Active Intermodal Matching (AIM)
The “crux” of the AIM hypothesis is that imitation is
“intentional” or “goal-directed;” the goal is to achieve a “match”
between perceived and executed actions.4 Goal-directedness is
what allows Meltzoff (2010, p. 19) to define NI as “genuine
imitation.” Indeed, true imitation is traditionally described
as having an active, intentional character (Piaget, 1951/1962).
Evidence for goal-directedness is a presumed process of response
correction in which infants use the target/goal as their criterion
for correction (Meltzoff and Moore, 1997).
Imitation is achieved through a “comparison” computation
described in Meltzoff and Moore (1997, pp. 185–186). The
comparison has two inputs: one is visually perceived action
features and the other is proprioceptively experienced action
features. Specifically, the computation compares the “configural
relation between organs” and/or the “speed, duration, and
manner” of the modeled action with the configural organ
relations and/or dynamic properties of the infants’ own actions
(Meltzoff and Moore, 1997, p. 184, p. 189). If the two inputs
are dissimilar, the output is a “mismatch,” and then the infant
executes a new attempt. If the two inputs are similar, the output
is a “match” and the infant has recognized the similarity between
her own and the other’s actions. For this reason, imitation entails
the recognition experience or the basic perception: “That seen
event is like this felt event” or “Here is something like me”
(Meltzoff, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2010). Note that it is essential to
AIM that the two inputs entering the computation are clearly
separate, as shown in Meltzoff and Moore’s (1997 p. 186)
schematic of AIM. If there are not two distinct inputs, the
idea of a comparison for the detection of similarities and
dissimilarities falls apart. Hence, Meltzoff and Moore (1997)
insist that the visual representations of the modeled actions
must be “independent” or “separate” from the corresponding
proprioceptive representations.5
In order to make the “action system” commensurable with
the “perceptual system,” evolution provided infants with a
“supramodal representational system” (Meltzoff and Moore,
1997, p. 186). This system provides “the lingua franca, the
abstract code, for connecting self and other” (Meltzoff, 2010,
p. 16). Nature designed infants with an “imitative brain” through
“Darwinian means” (Meltzoff, 2005, p. 55 and p. 57). This “special
neural-cognitive machine” evolved to ground social cognition,
including theory of mind and testing others’ identity (Meltzoff,
2002, p. 9; Meltzoff, 2013).
One of the main reasons for being skeptical of AIM is
the following: if infants have a developmentally crucial “innate
propensity to imitate” for which nature evolved a specialized
comparison mechanism (Meltzoff, 2002, 2007; p. 7), then the
empirical literature on differential imitation would be more
robust than it currently is (point ii. below). An extensive critique
of AIM can be found in Vincini and Jhang (unpublished). Here
we list some of our objections.
4See Meltzoff (1999, 2002, 2005, p. 254; p. 24; p. 72) and Meltzoff and Moore (1997,
1999 p. 180 and 182, p. 52).
5Meltzoff and Moore (1997, p. 188; cf. p. 185) assume that the “representation of
the other’s body is separate from [the] representation of the infant’s body.”
(i) Progressive match between infants’ responses and
the model does not have to be understood as
response correction. Rather, the phenomenon is more
parsimoniously interpreted as “increase in vigor [and
amplitude] with response repetition, or [. . .] perceptual
learning—[. . .] the formation of a better perceptual
representation of the modeled movement with repeated
exposures” (Ray and Heyes, 2011, p. 96). In plain words,
there is no clear evidence for the crux of the AIM
hypothesis!
(ii) If infants have an innate propensity to imitate and NI is
foundational for social cognition, infants should imitate
often and imitation should be easily detectable, but results
are highly variable and often negative (Ray and Heyes,
2011).
(iii) If neonatal propensity to imitate fulfills a central socio-
cognitive function, there seems to be no good explanation
of why imitation appears more easily in laboratory settings
(Meltzoff and Moore, 1992, 1994; Coulon et al., 2013) than
in naturalistic environments (cf. Oostenbroek et al., 2013,
p. 337; Oostenbroek et al., 2016).6
(iv) A comparison mechanism is particularly appropriate if
there is a wide range of gestures that potentially count
as “matches” for their respective models, since the system
needs to discriminate the matching response from the large
set of non-matching responses. However, current findings
suggest a quite limited range of candidate gestures for
differential imitation (Ray and Heyes, 2011).
(v) If the infants’ goal is to match the target they are presented
with, infants should imitate different gestures equally.
Nevertheless, two of the gestures listed by Meltzoff and
Moore (1997), i.e. TP and MO, exhibit CICM more often
than the others, and TP more than MO.7 AIM cannot
explain this fact without resorting to auxiliary assumptions.
(vi) Meltzoff and Moore (1992) explain the “drop out” of
imitation at 2–3 months by assuming that infants become
more interested in other forms of interactions. Others
have offered explanations more clearly grounded in motor
development (Keven and Akins, 2016). In the third post-
natal month, infants engage the social environment more
actively than before (Rochat and Striano, 1999), so why does
an active social behavior as that described by AIM decrease?
Importantly, Meltzoff and Moore’s (1992) explanation does
not account for the correlation between the declining rate
of TP and MO imitation and the declining rate of TP and
MO spontaneous production (Ray and Heyes, 2011).
(vii) Active intermodal matching seems to promote an
inflationary reading of the findings. For example, Meltzoff
(2005, 2010 p. 71; pp. 18–19) describes the Meltzoff
and Moore’s (1977, 1994) findings as if imitation simply
implied responding to a model with the corresponding
action; furthermore, Meltzoff and Moore’s (1997, p. 182)
depict their 1994 results on tongue-protrusion-to-the-side
imitation as the “generation of novel behaviors not found
6See Kugiumutzakis (1999) for an exception.
7See studies in footnote 2.
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in baseline activity.” However, in Section “The Operational
Definition and the Importance of Keeping it in Mind,”
we noted (a) that MO imitation was not affected by
the fact that infants responded with more TP than MO
to the MO model, and (b) that tongue-protrusion-to-
the-side did appear in baseline. Therefore, interpreting
differential imitation as “genuine imitation” may mislead
one to characterize it as unduly similar to prototype or
culture-learning imitation.
Association by Similarity Theory (AST)
Although anticipated by Kinsbourne (2002), AST was recently
introduced as a detailed alternative model to AIM by Vincini and
Jhang (unpublished). AST relies on domain-general processes of
association by similarity and can be considered as a consistent
application of Prinz’s (2005) ideomotor theory to NI. AST
interprets NI as differential induction of spontaneous behavior
through similarity.
Association by similarity is one of the main principles in
traditional associationism (Hume, 2000), has been recognized as
fundamental to a number of psychological phenomena (Larkey
and Markman, 2005; Allen, 2012), and studied in sophisticated
ways (Tversky, 1988; Nosofsky, 1992; Vigo, 2009). Considering
that practically any organism capable of learning must be able
to generalize its behavior to stimuli similar to those already
encountered, it can be supposed that similarity was functional
very early in evolution (Shepard, 1987).
From a phenomenological perspective, association by
similarity is a form of “operative intentionality” (Merleau-
Ponty, 2012), indicating regulated ways in which experiences
are connected so as to make our coherent experience of the
world, and any further higher-order cognition possible. In
general, association by similarity designates the process by
which a present experience or cognitive event is connected
to a similar past experience, reactivating or re-enacting the
content of the past experience. For example, I am used to
responding to specific stimuli in a specific way; thus, when I
encounter a new similar stimulus, a specific motor response
is facilitated (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1999). From a cognitivist
perspective, similarity can be defined as the process by which
bits of information tend to activate wholes in which they are
normally integrated. For instance, in Hebbian learning models
of perception, bits of information that are activated together
become associated to constitute a complex object representation.
Hence, a novel activation of an information bit due to sensory
input facilitates the activation of the associated bits that complete
the representation of the object, making object recognition
possible (Mongillo, 2012).8
In developmental studies, the habituation procedure relies
precisely on the relation of similarity between present and
past (harmless) stimuli (Van Heteren et al., 2000; Sommerville
and Woodward, 2005). Neonates show preference for familiar
stimuli, i.e., stimuli similar to experiences had before birth,
8Indeed, theories of perception in philosophy and cognitive science acknowledge
that present stimuli are apprehended in light of past perceptual experiences that
presented commonalities with the current stimuli (Barsalou, 2008; Meyer and
Damasio, 2009; Clark, 2013; Vetter and Newen, 2014).
in the domains of audition, taste, and smell (Hepper, 2015).
Importantly, similarity is context-dependent and, in each case,
it must be specified what features of the stimulus are relevant
to the (action-oriented) experience of the subject (Decock and
Douven, 2011). In the case of modeled actions in NI studies, the
features of the stimulus that may be relevant to the functioning
of similarity are action features that are habitually instantiated in
the infant’s own behavior. Specifically, each model will present
features that are routinely experienced in one of the infant’s
behavioral stereotypies.
The contrast between AST and AIM (Figure 2) can be
discussed by examining four crucial differences between AIM and
Prinz’s (2005) ideomotor theory, of which AST is an application.
First, as seen in Meltzoff and Moore’s (1997, p. 180 and p. 186)
diagrams, AIM posits no overlap between the perception and
action systems; rather, it posits a “supramodal” system specifically
evolved to make perception and action commensurable. In
contrast, Prinz’s more parsimonious scheme (1997, p. 130)
shows intrinsic overlap between perception and action. There
is no perception of an action without the representation of its
dynamic spatiotemporal features or of the final state achieved
through it; in the same way, there is no action planning without
representation of the action’s dynamic features and final state.
Prinz’s (1997, 2005, p. 144) hypothesis is that the very same
resources employed in perception to represent specific action
features are employed in action planning to represent the same
action features. The strength by which a specific perception
induces a specific action depends “on the degree of similarity, or
[representational] overlap” between them.
Second, in AIM, the imitative response is actively determined
by the infant, who modifies its responses in light of its goal. In
contrast, in the ideomotor theory of imitation, action facilitation
is determined passively by perceptual experience. In Prinz’s
texts (Prinz, 1990, 1997, 2002, 2005; Massen and Prinz, 2009;
Prinz et al., 2009), perceptions “induce,” “modulate,” “suggest,”
“facilitate,” “awaken,” “elicit,” or “prime,” corresponding actions.
The perceptual system may even be said to “seduce” the action
system. All these expressions denote passivity. Indeed, according
to the ideomotor principle, if the “idea” of an action comes to
mind it will tend to bring about the action (actually bringing it
about if antagonistic tendencies are inhibited). Now, the “idea”
of an action, i.e., its “representation” or “action plan,” can be
awakened by perceiving the action. Thus, insofar as perception
evokes the representation of an action, perception tends to
induce that action. For this reason, Prinz (2002, p. 160) states:
“action imitation is therefore a natural by-product of action
perception.” Certainly, passive induction presupposes activity,
both in general ideomotor theory (which assumes a motor
repertoire sufficiently exercised) and AST (according to which NI
experiments take advantage of infant spontaneous and habitual
action execution). Nonetheless, which action is facilitated over
others is a passive effect of perception. In short, while the crux of
the AIM hypothesis is “the active nature of the matching process”
(Meltzoff and Moore, 1997, p. 182), ideomotor theory and AST
propose passive similarity-based induction.
Third, as noted above, it is essential to AIM that
representations of visually specified and proprioceptively
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FIGURE 2 | The contrast between AIM and AST. AIM postulates a comparison between visual and action representations. If the comparison gives a “mismatch”
output (e.g., A2 does not match with V3, judged by the Equivalence Detector), a new action representation is activated for a novel imitative attempt. If the
comparison gives the “match” output, the infant has recognized a self-other similarity. In AST, there is no such comparison. Each visual representation overlaps the
most with the corresponding action representation (i.e., V1 overlaps the most with A1 and so on); thus, when a visual representation is activated, the corresponding
action representation tends to be activated too. The action’s “morphokinesis” (MK) designates the set of action features experienced both in visual perception and
action execution; the set includes the action’s kinetic features and the peculiar configurations of body parts achieved through the action. In AIM, the peculiar MK of
an action constitutes two distinct inputs that enter the comparison computation. In AST it simply indicates the information that visual and corresponding action
representations share in common.
specified action features be two “separate” inputs of the
comparison computation. In contrast, Prinz’s (2002, p. 153)
claim is that “identical representational structures are involved
in the perceiving and the performing of actions” (our emphasis)
and that, when these structures are activated in perception, they
tend to awaken the action plans in which they are habitually
integrated. No comparison computation is required for imitation.
As a consequence, there is no psychological act having similarity
or dissimilarity as its content (“that seen event is like this felt
event”). For ideomotor theory, “recognition of similarity” is not
necessary for imitation. If it were, action imitation would not
be “the natural by-product of action perception,” but rather the
achievement of a mechanism to be added to perception, i.e., the
mechanism for comparison/similarity recognition. Obviously,
ideomotor theory assumes a “functional role” of similarity
(Prinz, 2002), but this does not imply positing that similarity
is the object of a mental act. Similarity merely regulates how
specific perceptions facilitate specific actions.
Fourth, for AIM, imitation is underlain by a specialized
mechanism specifically evolved for social and socio-cognitive
functions.9 In contrast, Prinz (1997) provides evidence for
9In addition to the textual evidence provided in Section “Active Intermodal
Matching,” we should mention that this is how AIM is usually understood (Heyes
and Ray, 2004; Heyes, 2016).
the functioning of similarity in simple perception-action tasks
outside the social domain. Hence, Massen and Prinz (2009,
p. 2357) insist that “imitation is not based upon special purpose
mechanisms, but, rather, relies on the general organization of
learning and action control.”10
10Prinz presented the basic assumptions of common coding and ideomotor theory
in texts from 1990 to 2009 (cited above). However, in the context of broad
speculations on the nature of mind, agency and sociality, Prinz (2012) offers a
“reinterpretation” of common coding, which cannot be considered as just another
presentation of the same theory (pace Prinz). We believe that this reinterpretation
is unwarranted and jeopardizes the most meaningful insights of the common
coding approach.
The common coding approach is guided by phenomenological analysis and defined
event and action codes in terms of their function of representing “environmental
events,” i.e., events in the (spatiotemporal) world. The overlap (or communication)
between perception and action is just the consequence of the fact that perception
and action can share characteristic features (cf. Prinz, 1990, 1997, pp. 171–172, pp.
131–133; Prinz et al., 2009, p. 39). In contrast, Prinz (2012, pp. 66–68) abandons his
previous phenomenological orientation and defines action and event codes though
their role in a “hybrid view” that takes separate coding and arbitrary couplings
to constitute the basic workings of the mind, and common coding as appearing
in modules engineered to remedy the incommensurability of disparate coding. In
particular, it is assumed that these modules evolved specifically for socio-cognitive
functions (cf. Herwig et al., 2013, p. 15).
The consequence of reinterpreting event and action codes as entries in a secondary
system evolved on top of separate coding is the multiplication of “disparate
languages” and “translation” processes. In addition to translation from the sensory
to the motor, there is “increasing demand on disparate coding as it is required for
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Association by similarity theory consistently applies these
four features of ideomotor theory to NI. It goes further
than ideomotor theory in that it brings to the fore the
distinction between association as mere reactivation of sensory-
motor wholes and the recognition experience of the form
“a is like b” emerging from the comparison between distinct
representations. It also provides the necessary assumptions
to explain the details of NI. Hence AST emphasizes that
each infant’s behavioral habit or stereotypy instantiates action
characteristics experienced proprioceptively (i.e., a specific
pattern of movement, of configuring body parts across time).11
When a corresponding model is presented, infants experience
the same action characteristics visually. AST hypothesizes that
the same resources that represent those action features in action
planning and execution represent those features in perception.
Therefore, when those resources are activated in perception, they
tend to activate the specific motor resources in which they are
habitually integrated during action planning and execution. In
this way, a specific action plan, i.e., an action tendency or habitual
action possibility, is awakened by the perception of a particular
model. Hence model presentation contributes to promoting
a specific action tendency over other spontaneous tendencies.
Importantly, it does not suffice that the visual stimulus resembles
the proprioceptively experienced action pattern in some rough
way. The stimulus must be capable of keeping the infant calm and
attentive; therefore, it must fit the innate, but rapidly developing
perceptual preferences of human newborns (Simion et al., 2011).
This explains why non-social stimuli are often not capable of
inducing imitation (Jacobson, 1979; Abravanel and DeYong,
1991; Legerstee, 1991; Oostenbroek et al., 2016).
Association by similarity theory does not posit that infants
have an innate propensity to imitate or that NI is foundational for
social cognition. For AST, model presentation in the experimental
setting is simply an artificial (non-ecological) attempt at inducing
a habitual action. The action-awakening effect of the model is a
relatively weak factor compared to the highly variable affective
states and action tendencies that otherwise condition infants.
AST thereby accounts for the high variability of the extant
findings: because imitation is not supported by a specialized
propensity, alternative impulses also determine infant responses.
If infants at this age do not care about matching what others
do, but merely comply with their action tendencies (whether
spontaneous or partially induced), NI will not present the
translating information from the sensory and motor domains into the common
coding domain” (Prinz, 2012, p. 68). In other words, the same kinds of translation
processes that are required from sensory to motor codes are now required from
sensory codes to event codes and from action codes to motor codes. In Prinz’s
(2012) hybrid view, it is true not only that perception and action talk two disparate
languages, but also that there are disparate languages even within perception and
action, respectively! This is the opposite of the logic proposed in Prinz (1990, 1997),
where common coding was presented as a more appropriate account precisely
because it did not require arbitrary translation processes for relating perception
and action.
11Vincini and Jhang (unpublished) provide a list of studies attesting that the
frequency of the actions in question before birth (in particular during the third
trimester of pregnancy) is comparable to their frequency after birth. Cf. Keven
and Akins, 2016, section 7: “8 weeks before birth the behavioral repertoire of the
neonate is in place ready for post-natal life and all of the gestures tested in imitation
experiments come from this repertoire.”
empirical consistency one could expect on the basis of AIM, but
rather a messier and even conflicting panorama of results, much
like what the extant literature shows.
We propose that AST is more plausible than AIM (Vincini
and Jhang, unpublished). Arguments in favor of AST correspond
to arguments against AIM. Thus, the reader may compare the
following list with the one provided in the previous subsection.
(i) In AST, progressive match between response and model
is parsimoniously understood as increase in vigor and
amplitude of an induced response through energizing
specific bodily parts, response initiation, and repetition.
This Piagetian idea (that action calls for, or encourages,
its repetition) is consistent with the observation that
response rates increase over the course of the experiment
(Anisfeld et al., 2001; Anisfeld, 2005). Furthermore, given
the immaturity of the visual system, it should not be taken
for granted that infants immediately perceive the relevant
features of the model (Jones, 2009). Repeated exposure
allows infants to see the model’s action features more
distinctively; hence induction should occur in later phases
of the experiment when action features are effectively
perceived.
(ii) Association by similarity theory explains the ambiguity in
the extant empirical literature. Given the lack of any “innate
propensity to imitate,” complex variables and random
factors will often prevail in the infant psychological space
and induction will often not be successful.
(iii) The fact that imitation appears more frequently in
laboratory settings than naturalistic environments is
elegantly explained. NI is not an evolved response for social
interaction, but, in such experimental settings, an artificially
induced one. In contrast to environments rich in potential
distractors, imitation occurs more easily in settings where
conditions (e.g., uniform background, model luminance,
temperature) maximize a calm and attentive attitude in the
infant, which is usually rather fragile.
(iv) Association by similarity theory accommodates evidence
suggesting that the range of imitated gesture is not wide.
Indeed, it is plausible that similarity-based induction
may occur only for one or two gestures whose action
features are well differentiated in visual and proprioceptive
experience (e.g., a gesture frequently executed and whose
action features are markedly different from those of other
gestures).
(v) It is a core assumption in AST that there will be correlation
between imitation and spontaneous production: the more
habitual the gesture, the more easily it will be induced.
This prediction is confirmed. In Section “Active Intermodal
Matching,” we noted that TP is the most imitated gesture
and MO the second one. Here we add that TP is the gesture
that occurs most frequently in spontaneous behavior and
MO is the second most frequent.12
12Their frequencies of spontaneous execution are approximately 1.85 and 1.15/per
minute, respectively. The number for TP was retrieved and averaged across
the following studies: Heimann and Schaller, 1985, Heimann et al., 1989,
Meltzoff and Moore, 1989, Ullstadius, 1998, Nagy et al., 2013; that for MO across
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(vi) Association by similarity theory satisfactorily explains
why imitation drops out at 2–3 months. Because AST
understands imitation as differential solicitation of actions
that already tend to occur spontaneously, it predicts that if
the actions in question stop being spontaneously executed,
it will be difficult if not impossible to solicit them. This
prediction is verified by the existence of a correlation
between decrease in imitation and decrease in spontaneous
execution (Keven and Akins, 2016). Additionally, AST
sheds light on another factor that may contribute to
imitation drop out. When infants become more active
in social interaction at 2 months (Rochat and Striano,
1999), they will be less disposed to let the “choice” of their
behavior be determined passively by a stimulus. Infants will
behave according to a self-determined stance more often
and, consequently, actions passively induced by model
presentation will be less frequent.
(vii) Association by similarity theory does not require
differential imitation to be recognizable as ordinary
imitation, because experiment-based induction is an
artificial effect and may be detectable only in comparative
analyses.
Proposals for Experimental Design
The preceding discussion has left us with two hypotheses that are
more promising than the others: arousal and AST. Arousal, as an
explanation of NI, is essentially a negative hypothesis in the sense
that negative findings concerning differential imitation are the
primary evidence in its support. Indeed, we can say that arousal is
best verified by falsifying positive imitation hypotheses. As viable
imitation hypotheses are disqualified by the findings, arousal
emerges as the most sensible explanation. Hence, in this section,
we focus on procedures to test AST as a positive hypothesis for
NI.
Remember that the primary empirical question is whether
differential imitation exists and, for this reason, our discussion
aims at identifying procedures for better addressing this
question. However, one should also keep in mind that different
models of differential imitation imply different experimental
procedures to test their validity. Specifically, from AIM
derive experimental procedures that have been consistently
implemented in Oostenbroek et al. (2016). AST predicts that
those procedures will likely not be effective in detecting or
inducing imitation and recommends opposite procedures. Thus,
before outlining the procedures to test AST, it is opportune to
recall those deriving from AIM.
Oostenbroek et al. (2016) designed an experimental procedure
to test the hypothesis that imitation has the kinds of socio-
cognitive functions postulated by AIM. If infants have an innate
propensity to imitate and this propensity is foundational for
the following: Heimann and Schaller, 1985, Heimann et al., 1989, Coulon et al.,
2013. Compare these frequencies with that of, for example, spontaneous lip
movements, i.e., 0.14 per minute (Ekman and Rosenberg, 1997). Frequencies for
the other gestures can be found in other studies and are significantly lower than
those for TP and MO (Meltzoff and Moore, 1989; Kurjak et al., 2004; Oostenbroek
et al., 2016).
social cognition, if imitation is a behavior characteristic of
“typical newborns” (Meltzoff, 2010, p. 16):
(i) Results should be generalizable to typical newborns;
so imitation should be tested in large populations;
Oostenbroek et al. (2016) examined 106 infants.
(ii) Imitation should be detectable through measures of typical
behavior, e.g., by averaging rates of action production across
all infants, as Oostenbroek et al. (2016) did.
(iii) The increase of production of the modeled action should
be significant with respect to any control model taken of
a large set of different kinds of models; Oostenbroek et al.
(2016) used 11 models, including facial, non-social, vocal,
and hand gestures.
(iv) Infants should change their behavior as the behavior to be
matched changes; thus, imitation of different models should
occur in the same test session; Oostenbroek et al. (2016)
presented 11 models in a row in an 11 min long session.
(v) Imitation should occur in naturalistic environments;
Oostenbroek et al. (2016) tested infants at their homes.
Because they found no imitation, Oostenbroek et al. (2016,
p. 3) concluded AIM is “not empirically supported and should
be modified or abandoned altogether.”
Assuming AST, we can explain why a design of this kind would
not work and suggest alternative procedures:
(i) Testing a very large sample makes it impractical for
experimenters to focus on finding the optimal conditions
for induction in each infant. For example, Oostenbroek
et al. (2016) say little or nothing about how experimenters
captured the infant’s optimal alert state and facilitated
attention to the model. Experimenters should have the
possibility to monitor the infant beginning 10–15 min after
feeding and wait till the quiet alert state comes—State 4
in Brazelton and Nugent’s (2011) scale. The infant must
be calm, content, and attentive as much as possible for
the entire session. There should be a preliminary phase in
which the experimenter seeks the optimal posture for the
infant and attracts attention to the model (e.g., producing
sounds without opening the mouth).13 Simpson et al. (2014)
proposed a sample size of at least 26 infants based on
a priori power analysis. Because experimenters should
focus on creating favorable affective conditions, we propose
sample size need not be greater than 30 infants.
(ii) Imitation as differential induction does not occur often;
so averaging frequencies across infants who have all
sorts of different action tendencies tends to “iron out”
genuine episodes of imitation. Infants are not unified by
a propensity to imitate; therefore, each infant should be
treated independently. We propose each infant be its own
control (i.e., comparing responses to different models for
each infant).
(iii) Increasing the number of control models increases the
possibility that random factors in action production will
13See Heimann (2000, p. 185) for evidence for the correlation between attention
and imitation.
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obscure imitation effects. Moreover, different kinds of
model may interest or arouse infants to different extents,
but interest/arousal levels should be kept as constant as
possible across models. We propose using no more than
four facial models.
(iv) Infants are not imitating machines and cannot be expected
to imitate 11 models in one session.14 An induced action can
be executed more than a minute after model presentation
(see Heimann, 2000 for a discussion of the slowness of
infant responses). In Oostenbroek et al.’s (2016) design,
“slow” responses of this kind may end up counting against
the imitation effect (because they can occur in the response
period for a subsequent model). We propose there should
be only one model in each session and response phases
should be longer.
(v) Naturalistic environments are rich in potential distractors
and do not permit optimized conditions. Sessions
should occur in silent laboratory settings with adjustable
temperature and lighting. The visual background should
be a uniform soothing color and the modeler’s face must
be spotlighted and its luminance regulated. Note that it is
not a problem to include in the experimental design an
unusual face presentation such as the modeler’s spotlighted
face. Unlike AIM, AST does not posit that NI is a typical
behavior occurring in the ordinary conditions of infant-
caregiver interaction. Quite the contrary, AST recommends
making use of conditions, whether usual or unusual, that
may enhance attention to the features of the modeled
actions. Spotlighting the modeler’s face may well be one
of those conditions, given that NI studies implementing it
have produced positive results (e.g., Meltzoff and Moore,
1989, 1994; Legerstee, 1991; see Kugiumutzakis, 1999, for a
similar procedure).
Experimental procedures in the extant empirical literature
vary widely (Simpson et al., 2014). Some studies already apply the
procedures we propose to different extents (e.g., Heimann and
Schaller, 1985; Meltzoff and Moore, 1992, 1994; Kugiumutzakis,
1999). Therefore, our goal is not to outline innovative designs, but
to specify procedures that can best detect differential induction
(i.e., test AST). Our proposals are somewhat abstract and ideal,
but may guide experimentalists in making concrete choices. The
first proposal below can be classified as a “Many-Models” design
because each infant sees more than one model in the course of the
experiment.
The experimenter monitors the infant and takes it to the
laboratory room when it is ready. The session begins with a
120-s acclimatization phase in which the experimenter finds a
comfortable position for the infant and leaves it to acclimate
to the environment. When the acclimatization phase ends, the
experimenter’s face is spotlighted and an attention-catching phase
14Oostenbroek et al. (2016, Supplemental Materials) report: “If the infant became
sleepy or upset, testing was paused and calming methods such as rocking, jiggling
or walking the infant around the room were used to bring the infant back to a
quiet alert state.” However, an infant who continues with the test after having cried
or fallen asleep is not in the same affective state as one who starts the experiment
fresh. Long testing sessions like those in Oostenbroek et al. (2016) make it difficult
to keep the infant affective state constant and optimal for the entire test.
begins in which the experimenter makes sure the infant is looking
at her. The experimenter keeps the mouth closed and does
not rotate the head up to this point. When the experimenter
judges that the infant is looking at her, the baseline condition
begins. This condition consists of 180-s uninterrupted passive
face (PF) presentation. Subsequently, a new attention-catching
phase occurs; when the attention requirement is fulfilled, the test
phase begins. In total, the test phase is 180-s long. It is composed
of four 15-s presentation phases (here we follow the suggestion
from Simpson et al. (2014) that total presentation should be at
least 60-s) alternated with four 15-s response phases in which the
experimenter shows PF, plus an additional 60-s response period
to allow for slow or delayed responses. During each presentation
phase, a gesture is modeled four times. The next session occurs
the following day. In total, there can be a minimum of 3 days-
3 sessions and maximum of 4 days-4 sessions. Each session
presents a different model and the order of models across days
is counterbalanced. We propose the following models: TP, MO,
LP, and HR. To track the longitudinal aspect of spontaneous
activity and the development of action repertoires, each infant
goes through all 3 or 4 sessions in the first, third, fifth, and seventh
post-natal week.
This design allows experimenters to collect a fairly large
amount of data and realize different kinds of analyses. In
order to catch all possible imitative responses, it is best
to collect gesture frequencies during response periods and
presentation periods as well (Simpson et al., 2014). For
each infant, the frequency of a gesture in response to the
corresponding model must be compared to its frequency in
response to other models and baseline. For each gesture,
the analysis will divide infants in three groups: (1) highest
frequency in response to corresponding model; (2) highest
frequency in response to another model or baseline; (3)
equal highest frequency in response to corresponding model
and one other model or baseline. Under the null hypothesis
(differential imitation does not occur), a certain distribution
of the findings will be expected. For example, assuming there
is a baseline condition and four models conditions, and that
group (3) is empty, approximately a fifth of the infants
should appear in (1). However, if (1) has a significantly larger
proportion of infants, the imitation hypothesis for the gesture is
verified.
In AST, we do not assume the existence of an innate imitation
propensity enduring for the first 8 post-natal weeks. Moreover,
levels of spontaneous activity may vary across weeks. Thus,
longitudinal analyses averaging data from different weeks should
be avoided and each week of testing should be analyzed
separately. Obviously, when analyzing the data from each single
week, it does not hurt to calculate the averages of a gesture
across infants and compare them (as most published studies do),
but we are more hopeful toward taking each infant as its own
control. Among other things, this method of analysis allows one
to examine particularly high rates of a certain gesture in single
sessions (“outliers”). For example, suppose that two subjects
perform a particularly high rate of MO in a single session. If the
session in which this high rate appears is a MO model session,
then it is likely that MO has been induced in these cases.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 August 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1323
fpsyg-08-01323 August 2, 2017 Time: 17:16 # 12
Vincini et al. Neonatal Imitation
The five experimental conditions proposed acquire a special
significance in AST. Study of spontaneous behaviors during
baseline (PF) is key in AST because it allows one to test the
assumption that the more a gesture is habitual, the easier it
will be to induce it. If infants in group (1) present a higher
baseline than the other groups for the gesture they imitate, AST
is supported. The imitation-spontaneous production correlation
can be investigated at an even more strictly individual level: if
baseline production for a gesture is particularly high (compared
to other gestures of the same infant or to the mean baseline for
all infants), according to AST it is more likely that the infant will
imitate that gesture.15
Tongue protrusion does not serve the purpose of verifying
AST as well as other gestures. The arousal theorist can always
interpret CICM for TP as an arousal response. Hence, if one
of the four gesture/models has to be eliminated, we suggest
eliminating TP. The interesting question related to TP is
whether MO decreases with respect to baseline in response to
TP presentation. If yes, the arousal theorist can rely on the
argument that competition between TP and MO production
explains CICM for MO with respect to the TP model. If no,
the arousal theorist cannot rely on that argument. MO is a
promising gesture for AST because we can assume that the
proprioceptive experience of MO is relatively well differentiated
from the experience of other actions. The proprioceptive
experience of MO implies a morphokinetic rhythm alternating
an expansion/stretching phase and a shrinking/relaxation phase;
the same pattern can be perceived in the MO model. Thus,
it should be possible to induce MO. It can be granted that
the CICM for TP is an arousal effect, but if CICM for MO
is proved to exist with respect to baseline and models other
than TP, AST is supported. Meltzoff and Moore (1992, 1994)
use CICM in MO duration as evidence for imitation. We
agree that duration can count as an indicator of differential
imitation because action induction may cause the action to be
more pronounced and, therefore, longer than in spontaneous
execution.
Head rotation is another action that is relatively well
differentiated in proprioceptive experience because it presents
a peculiar trajectory and rhythm (e.g., it is a more continuous
movement than MO). However, HR imitation should be carefully
distinguished from “perceptual tethering,” as Meltzoff and
Moore (1989) ingeniously do. Most probably, LP is not well
differentiated in proprioceptive behavior; thus, LP imitation
should be rare or inexistent. This does not falsify AST because,
15Anisfeld (2005; Anisfeld et al., 2001) raises the issue that the order of conditions
in one experimental session may affect TP production. One may think that this
is potentially a problem for the Many-Models design just proposed because TP
increase with respect to baseline may be due to the order of these conditions
(although we remind the reader that AST does not put much emphasis on TP and
so, if imitation is attested for another gesture, e.g., MO, AST is supported). If one
decides to give weight to Anisfeld et al.’s (2001) findings, there is a simple way to
eliminate the possible effect of the order of conditions. It is sufficient to eliminate
the PF condition before the test phases for the other models and add a further
session on a separate day in which the PF condition is treated just like the other
test phases. In this way, all conditions count as conditions occurring first. This
is a valid alternative design because it has the advantage of making experimental
sessions shorter.
for AST to be supported, it can be sufficient that a gesture other
than TP present a consistent CICM.
Association by similarity theory can be tested through a “One-
Model” design as well. We employ this expression to designate a
procedure followed in Meltzoff and Moore (1994). Each infant is
assigned to a group and each group is associated with a particular
condition (one of the four models or baseline). Each infant is
tested only under the condition associated with its group. In
other words, the infant sees only the stimulus associated with
its group in all sessions for 3–4 days. If the mean frequency for
the action presented to a group is greater in that group than in
groups to which other models or PF have been presented, the
imitation hypothesis is confirmed. The advantage of the One-
Model procedure is that, through insistence on one model over
different sessions, induction may be facilitated. Indeed, Meltzoff
and Moore (1994) found a positive result. The disadvantage is
that it is not possible to take each infant as its own control.
Finally, we recommend that, apart from the change of model,
experimenters seek to keep the components of the visual stimulus
constant across all sessions.16 In all cases, eye-tracking should
be used as much as possible to measure infant attention and
determine what models are most interesting to infants (Coulon
et al., 2013). Physiological measures can be used to register other
aspects of infant arousal.
Significance for the Field of Social
Cognition
Notoriously, social cognition is one of the fields to which NI
has been taken to be relevant. Since our critical examination of
theories (see Explanations for the NI Findings) left us with two
most promising perspectives on NI, we address the question of
its implications for social cognition from those two perspectives.
What is the significance of NI for social cognition if the arousal
hypothesis is correct? Or if AST is?
In light of the arousal perspective, one can hypothesize
a dynamic of this kind: adult facial movement causes infant
arousal, arousal causes infant response, response affects parents,
parents are encouraged to continue with facial games, etc. In this
way, arousal could facilitate early social interaction. Therefore,
arousal is naturally integrated in theories of the indispensability
of affective interaction for the development of social cognition
(Gallagher, 2001, 2005; Trevarthen and Aitken, 2001; Reddy,
2008) and empirical investigation on infant-caregiver interaction
should seek to specify its role in more precise terms. On
this matter, one question is whether parents are drawn into
the interaction by the fact that they (over-) interpret infants’
responses as imitative. This is unlikely. Meltzoff and Moore
(1977, p. 77) noted that “no parent was aware of ever having
seen babies imitating [. . .]; indeed, most were astonished at the
idea.” And even another defender of the existence of differential
imitation and its social-communicative function suggested that
imitation affected parents without parent recognizing it as
16Features of the modeler that may distract infants should be avoided. For example,
glasses or excessive hair are salient to infant (Meltzoff and Moore, 1994) and may
distract them from the models.
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imitation (Heimann, 2002).17 Thus, if arousal contributes to
social interaction, it is probably not because caregivers interpret
infant responses as imitative, but because these responses have a
different (perhaps more subtle) social meaning.
Heimann (2000, p. 181) raised the possibility that “NI exists,
but plays no major role in early infant development”—although
he did not endorse this view. As it should be clear from Sections
“The Operational Definition and the Importance of Keeping it in
Mind” to “Proposals for Experimental Design,” AST is consistent
with such a hypothesis. Hence one may wonder whether, from
the AST perspective, NI has any relevance to the field of social
cognition. In this regard, we would like to emphasize two points.
First, AST is compatible with arousal having a role in provoking
infant responses, especially TP. Thus, anything that can be said
about how arousal may contribute to social interaction can be
happily accepted in AST. Moreover, AST does not exclude the
idea that similarity-based induction may occur sometimes in real
mother-infant interaction (outside an experimental context). If
it occurs, the infant’s response will be characterized by timing
and kinetic features apt to facilitate interaction, whether or not
caregivers interpret the response as imitative.
Second, if AST were verified, it would support the Direct Social
Perception (DSP) hypothesis (Gallagher, 2015). This hypothesis
is part of a wider approach to social cognition called Interaction
Theory (IT), which is proposed as an alternative to the traditional
theories of mindreading, Theory-Theory (TT) and Simulation
Theory (ST). In order to show how AST would support DSP, it
is necessary to provide some background on DSP and Meltzoff’s
version of TT.
Direct social perception relies on insights from the
phenomenological tradition. In authors like Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty, the dynamics operating in ordinary perception
play a role in social perception as well. For example, Husserl
(1931/1999) suggests that, after a child learns the meaning
of scissors, she directly perceives a newly encountered pair as
scissors. That is, the child does not have to (1) recall scissors
experienced in the past, (2) compare the present object with
objects experienced in the past, (3) recognize that the object
is like some other scissors previously experienced, and (4)
infer that the object is a pair of scissors. These mental acts
(1–4) do not occur. Rather, perception of the current stimulus
involves a reawakening of sensory-motor content (a reactivation
of neuronal patterns) in virtue of the similarity between the
stimulus and specific past experiences. More specifically, Husserl
and other phenomenologists take this similarity to be pragmatic
or affordance-based, defined in terms of what I can do with the
object. The crucial point is that pragmatic similarity regulates
how we perceive visual stimuli, but is not the object of a mental
act—the act of recognizing the similarity between different
objects (3) does not occur. The child simply sees a pair of
scissors.
Now, just as we perceive the specific pragmatic meaning
of an object on the basis of an association by similarity
with past experienced objects, so can we perceive some
17Heimann (2002) hints at the idea that, if some parents today think that neonates
imitate them, it is because research on NI has been widely popularized.
mental states (such as action intentions, i.e., low-level motor
intentions, or ‘intentions-in-action’) in others on the basis of
the pragmatic similarity of their behavior with our own. This
is not accomplished through a comparison of the visual image
of the other with the experience of one’s own body. Rather,
similar body-schematic (action production) processes involved
in fulfilling our own action intentions are activated in perceiving
the other’s action (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). I experience my bodily
behaviors as intentional; thus, when I encounter the similar
behaviors of others, I apprehend them in terms of associated
intentions. Thus, DSP does not deny that social perception is
affected by past experience (Gallagher, 2008; Zahavi, 2011, 2014).
In opposition to TT and ST, however, DSP denies that social
perception involves intermediary steps (e.g., the perception of
“mere behavior” or a comparison between behaviors, theoretical
inference, simulation routines) to infer mental states.
Consider how infants perceive the goal-directedness of
others’ actions. A growing body of literature attests that action
production influences action perception: mechanisms involved
in action production allow infants to perceive others’ action
as goal-directed, or intentional, behavior (Woodward, 1998;
Sommerville and Woodward, 2005; Sommerville et al., 2005,
2008; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Hauf et al., 2007; Cannon et al.,
2011; Hauf and Power, 2011; Filippi and Woodward, 2015).
Meltzoff’s (2005, 2007, 2009; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997; Meltzoff
and Decety, 2003) version of TT interprets this evidence for
the role of action production in action perception by separating
two cognitive operations. The first is the recognition that the
other is “like me,” as evidenced in NI. The second is the
inference that, because others behave “like me,” they have the
kinds of mental states I have. In contrast, DSP can rely on
the tacit functioning of pragmatic similarity. When the infant
perceives others’ actions, it interprets them in light of its
similar goal-directed behavior: similarity is not the object of a
cognitive act, but the mechanism in virtue of which a specific
content, i.e., goal-directedness, is awakened and put to use in
perception. In DSP, others’ actions are not perceived as being
“like my own actions.” Rather, they are directly perceived as
goal-directed.
The difference between Meltzoff’s TT and DSP is not just
verbal. The two theories require two different interpretations
of imitation, postulate different psychological states and these
postulations lead to different empirical predictions. Meltzoff ’s
TT is based on AIM. Recall that AIM assumes that imitation
entails the recognition of self-other similarities, the thought
“That seen event is like this felt event,” and this recognition is
implemented by a specialized cognitive machinery evolved to
provide infants with the “innate grasp that others are like me”
(Meltzoff, 2002, p. 9). If AIM is verified, imitation entails the
comparison and the recognition of similarity between actions
of self and others. Hence Meltzoff’s TT is supported, because
it becomes plausible to assume that later low-level mental
state attribution is an inference grounded on recognition of
similarities.
In contrast, if AST is verified, imitation does not entail
comparison and similarity recognition. Thus DSP is
strengthened in two ways: (a) imitation does not attest to a
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comparison/similarity recognition that can function as premise
for inferences to mental states; (b) the idea that similarity operates
in action perception without being the object of a psychological
act is supported. That is to say, just as in NI similarity with
one’s own behavior merely awakens specific action tendencies,
so in action perception it simply awakens the pragmatic sense in
reference to which actions are interpreted, i.e., goal-directedness.
In Section “Explanations for the NI Findings,” we argued
that AIM is disqualified by the findings. Consequently, we
submit that Meltzoff’s TT is undermined too. Yet AST is still
a viable hypothesis and can contribute to validate DSP. AST
shows that DSP is right in denying the need for postulating
a specialized module for comparison/recognition of self-other
similarities. Indeed, since AST relies on similarity as a domain-
general process of association, DSP is supported in claiming that
action production affects action perception in the same way as
past experience influences ordinary perception. In perception,
similarity awakens processes in light of which one comprehends
the current stimulus. No intermediary act of comparison with
past experiences is required.
For these reasons, from the AST perspective NI has important
significance for theorizing on social cognition. It can lend support
to theories of social interaction and to DSP.
CONCLUSION
As it has been noted many times, questions about NI have
implications for neuroscience, the development of imitation and
social cognition, and for the inquiry into the general relationships
between action and perception. In this paper, we have discussed
the importance of keeping in mind the operational definition
of NI as differential imitation for more than one gesture.
This definition contains key reminders: differential imitation
neutralizes the arousal explanation; a mere increase of one gesture
with respect to baseline does not count as evidence for imitation;
and NI does not look like prototypical imitation. We examined
explanations for the findings and argued that two of them, the
arousal hypothesis and AST, have the best chances for success.
The latter hypothesis is a consistent application of the ideomotor
approach (Prinz, 1990, 1997, 2005) , and sees differential
imitation as differential induction of spontaneous behavior
through similarity. We then outlined experimental designs aimed
at testing the AST hypothesis. In contrast with Oostenbroek
et al.’s (2016) symptomatic study, AST leads experimenters to
implement procedures that may facilitate differential induction
and its detection: affective-attentional control, a sample size
constrained for maximal internal validity, taking each infant as
its own control, employing a limited number of control models
and only one model in each session, comprehensive response
phases, strictly regulated settings, repetition of the same stimulus
across different days (in the One-Model design), analysis of
the correlation between spontaneous production and imitation,
and of the behavior of individual infants. Moreover, AST makes
specific predictions for different models, shifting the focus to
MO and HR. We concluded by considering the relationship
between the topic of NI and the field of social cognition. We
noted how, from the point of view of AST, the NI findings are
naturally integrated in theories of social interaction and support
the particular way in which the DSP hypothesis can account for
the effect of action production on action perception.
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